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Abstract
It has been widely understood for many years that an essential component of a Mars Sample Return mission is a
Sample Receiving Facility (SRF). The purpose of such a facility would be to take delivery of the flight hardware
that lands on Earth, open the spacecraft and extract the sample container and samples, and conduct an agreed-
upon test protocol, while ensuring strict containment and contamination control of the samples while in the SRF.
Any samples that are found to be non-hazardous (or are rendered non-hazardous by sterilization) would then be
transferred to long-term curation. Although the general concept of an SRF is relatively straightforward, there has
been considerable discussion about implementation planning.
The Mars Exploration Program carried out an analysis of the attributes of an SRF to establish its scope,
including minimum size and functionality, budgetary requirements (capital cost, operating costs, cost profile),
and development schedule. The approach was to arrange for three independent design studies, each led by an
architectural design firm, and compare the results. While there were many design elements in common iden-
tified by each study team, there were significant differences in the way human operators were to interact with
the systems. In aggregate, the design studies provided insight into the attributes of a future SRF and the complex
factors to consider for future programmatic planning. Key Words: Mars—Sample Receiving Facility (SRF)—
Mars Sample Return (MSR)—Curation—Biosafety—Test protocol—Sample preservation—Containment—Clean
room—NASA—Planetary protection. Astrobiology 9, 745–758.
1. Introduction
Arobotic mission to collect samples of Mars and trans-port them to Earth has been considered in one form or
another for more than three decades (e.g., NRC, 1978, 1990a,
1990b, 1994, 1996, 2002, 2007; MEPAG ND-SAG, 2008, and
references therein). Although different variants of thismission
over the years have taken different names, we refer to the
mission described in this paper as Mars Sample Return, or
MSR. In an engineering sense, MSR as a flight mission is one
of the most complex undertakings NASA and its European
partners have ever considered—there are some fascinating
challenges related to the flight system (see, e.g., Bar-Cohen
et al., 2005; Gershman et al., 2005; Mattingly et al., 2005; Ste-
phenson and Willenberg, 2006; iMARS, 2008; Moura et al.,
2008; Backes et al., 2009). In addition to the complexities of the
flight system, the planning for management of the samples
once they arrive on Earth is equally critical. Perhaps the most
important single element of the ‘‘ground system’’ is a facility
referred to as the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF), whose
purpose would be to receive the returned spacecraft, extract
the sealed sample container, open it to access the samples, and
then carry out a set of tests under strict containment condi-
tions to determine whether the samples are hazardous.
The SRF element of the overall mission is mandatory be-
cause of international planetary protection agreements (see,
e.g., Atlas, 2008; COSPAR, 2008). The NRC (1997) pointed
out that, though the probability of extant martian life in such
a returned sample is very low, it is nonzero. Because of this, a
sample returned from Mars would be subject to the very
rigorous rules and practices in place to protect Earth from the
potential risk of extraterrestrial life. The interested reader can
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refer to the specifics of these policies at COSPAR (2008) and
MEPAG ND-SAG (2005, 2008). Although the purpose of the
policy is clear, there has been considerable debate about the
nature of the facility required to implement it.
The purpose of this paper is to summarize a set of studies
that were undertaken in 2003 to help constrain the minimum
facility for policy compliance, with a specific goal of defining
its probable basic attributes and estimating its cost. Although
MSR is not currently approved by any of the international
space agencies, this information will be needed prior to
planning the budget and timeline for the SRF should MSR
proceed in the future.
1.A. History and context
The first in-depth discussion of facility planning for an
MSR-related SRFwas carried out in connection with planning
for the MSR 2003–2005 Project. The term ‘‘Mars Receiving
Facility’’ was introduced at the Mars Sample Handling,
Distribution, and Analysis Workshop (D. McCleese and M.
Drake, Chairs), which was held at Caltech in February 1999.
This facility concept was renamed later that year, however,
to the more generic ‘‘Sample Receiving Facility’’ (or SRF) by
NASA’s newly formed Mars Returned Sample Handling
team because of the possibility that such a facility might be
used in the future for samples originating from planetary
objects other than Mars.
Reports from studies and workshops during the decade
leading up to the 2003–2005MSR effort established the context
for SRF design and implementation. In 1995, NASA asked the
National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study per-
taining to sample return and address the key issues1 associ-
ated with the potential risks to Earth of samples returned from
Solar System bodies, such as Mars. The NRC panel focused
principally on Mars and produced a report (NRC, 1997) that
became a cornerstone for much of the planetary protection–
related work of the MSR 2003–2005 Project. In addition, the
NASA Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel
(MSHARP) made recommendations (Carr et al., 1999) re-
garding what is required to certify returned samples as non-
hazardous and the considerations associated with sample
receiving, curation, and distribution. MSHARP recommended
that the samples be treated as hazardous until proven other-
wise, consistent with the NRC (1997).
Because the earlier reports provided advice at a fairly
general level, the NRC followed up with a study of the cri-
teria for release of samples from biocontainment in an SRF
(NRC, 2002). Of relevance to the present study, the report
recommended that only the most basic operations should be
conducted inside the facility, and it should be designed to the
smallest and simplest possible scale consistent with its dual
roles as a biological containment and clean-room facility,
with detailed protocols and procedures for handling and
testing martian samples. This report additionally argued that
it would take at least 7 years in advance of the anticipated
return of martian samples to plan and construct an SRF.
Beginning in 1997, NASA sponsored a series of workshops
(e.g., DeVincenzi et al., 1999; Race and Rummel, 2000; Race
et al., 2001a, 2001b) to prepare a first draft of the test protocol
that would evaluate the safety of returned martian samples.
The overall objective was ‘‘to produce a draft protocol by
which returned martian sample materials could be assessed
for biological hazards and examined for evidence of life (ex-
tant or extinct), while safeguarding the purity of the samples
from possible terrestrial contamination.’’ The resulting Draft
Test Protocol (Rummel et al., 2002) was published with the
expectation that there would be continued revisions as more
information became available about Mars and analytical
techniques improved. The Draft Test Protocol is described in
greater detail below, because it served as a source of design
requirements for the SRF studies summarized here.
NASA’s MSR 2003–2005 Project advanced as far as its
Preliminary Design Review before it was cancelled in 2000
(O’Neil and Cazaux, 2000). NASA recognized, however, that
if an MSR project were restarted in the future, it must include
realistic planning parameters for the SRF, including cost,
schedule, and size. Therefore, planning activity for the SRF
continued through 2004, several years beyond the cancellation
of the flight mission. A major aspect of this planning was a set
of three independent competed industry studies that were
carried out in 2003–2004. These studies have formed the basis
for a much clearer understanding of the possible require-
ments, design, cost, timeline, and operational considerations
for an MSR-related SRF and are the focus of this paper.
2. Methods and Conceptual Requirements
No individual facilities currently exist that meet all the
requirements of the SRF (which are described in a following
section) (see also Atlas, 2008). Moreover, there are technical
reasons related to achievement of the necessary standards of
cleanliness, which led us to conclude that it was very un-
likely to achieve an acceptable SRF by modifying an existing
building. Thus, for the purpose of this study, we focused
only on the planning of a new facility. This would constitute
a reference point to which possible alternative options re-
lated to modification of existing facilities could be compared
in the future.
In response to a NASA-originated solicitation, seven let-
ters of interest were received in May 2003. Through an
evaluation board, three architectural design teams were se-
lected to carry out separate $200 thousand, 6-month studies.
Each team had industry experts who specialize in clean-
room design, biohazard considerations, aseptic processing,
robotics, and advanced instrumentation. The three teams
were led by Industrial Design and Construction (IDC) of
Portland, Oregon; Lord, Aeck, Sargent (LAS) of Atlanta,
Georgia; Flad & Associates (FLAD) of Madison, Wisconsin.
The three industry teams operated independently and de-
livered their analyses in 2004 in the form of final reports to be
used by NASA for future planning.
Each of the architectural design teams was asked to con-
duct a design study and also provide a cost estimate for an
1The NRC (1997) addressed the following issues: (a) the potential
and probability for a living entity to be included in a sample re-
turned from another Solar System body, in particular Mars; (b) the
scientific investigations that should be conducted to reduce uncer-
tainty in the above assessment; (c) the potential for large-scale effects
on the environment resulting from the release of any returned entity;
(d) the status of technological measures that could be taken on a
mission to prevent the unintended release of a returned sample into
Earth’s biosphere; and (e) the criteria for controlled distribution of
sample material, taking note of the anticipated regulatory frame-
work.
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SRF that operates at a containment level equivalent to
Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4). For the purpose of the analysis, it
was assumed that the SRF would receive samples from
Mars collected by a mission launched in 2013, with the
samples returned to Earth at the end of 2016, by which time
the SRF would have been certified to receive samples. The
teams were asked to prepare designs that would meet re-
quirements for (a) ensuring containment of potential non-
terrestrial biological material in the sample, (b) preventing
contamination of the sample by terrestrial contaminants
(biological and inorganic materials), and (c) permitting pre-
liminary examination, hazard assessment, and life-detection
analyses of the samples.
2.A. Draft test protocol
The design teams were told that the SRF concepts must
permit implementation of the Draft Test Protocol (Rummel
et al., 2002). This document lays out an approach for returned
samples to be subsampled and subjected to ‘‘sufficient testing
to evaluate them against the release criteria.’’ The Protocol
itself has three main segments: physical=chemical proces-
sing, life-detection testing, and biohazard testing. In the
Protocol, these tests are defined, and flow charts are used to
complement the text in describing the conceptual flow
through the test process. There is emphasis throughout on
approaches to sample examination that are credible, thor-
ough, and informative while maintaining a priority for
sample preservation—both in quantity and quality. The de-
velopers of the Protocol were careful to point out that the
tests must be sufficient to answer the key questions con-
cerning possible life and biohazard while preserving, to the
greatest extent possible, the quantity of sample available for
future science. Therefore, the Draft Test Protocol ‘‘attempts a
compromise between the desire to destructively analyze only
a small proportion of the returned sample by planetary
protection testing, and the need to assure safety by testing all
portions of all samples.’’ All the while, the sample portions
preserved for science must remain pure (uncontaminated)
and unaltered to the greatest extent possible.
2.B. Facility scope
For the purpose of the industry studies, long-term, major
scientific research in the SRF was not to be considered—
either the samples meet the release criteria and are allocated
to non-containment laboratories or additional facilities at the
SRF must be created. The design teams were told that SRF
concepts under consideration should represent the minimum
facility to implement the Draft Test Protocol on representa-
tive samples within 6–9 months of sample receipt. To comply
with the Draft Test Protocol, the teams were to assume the
need for testing on live animals (although it was recognized
that this need might eventually be eliminated). Further, they
were to address whether it would be preferable to include
this functionality in the SRF or make use of some secondary
facility that meets the SRF containment requirements though
not necessarily the sample cleanliness requirements.
The design concepts for the SRF had to provide for the
following:
(1) Receiving and opening the spacecraft, removing the
samples;
(2) Sample splitting and packaging as required to provide
subsamples for further testing as specified in the Draft
Test Protocol;
(3) The capability to sterilize subsamples for analysis
outside of containment;
(4) The sterilization of any waste products from the SRF
that might have been exposed to martian samples;
(5) The capability to prepare and package martian sam-
ples that have been certified non-hazardous for trans-
fer to a Mars Sample Curation Facility and distribution
for further science investigations.
2.C. Containment and sample purity
The special considerations of biocontainment, coupled
with the limited amount of precious sample and the scientific
requirements for sample purity, were fundamental to the
industry concept studies. For the purposes of the studies,
contamination of returned martian samples fell into three
broad categories, based on expected and proposed areas of
scientific investigations: biological, organic, and inorganic. In
practice, an investigation in one of these areas might not be
adversely affected by contamination in a different area.
However, the first-order principle was that all three cate-
gories must be considered together. A report by Neal (2000)
on behalf of the NASA Curation and Analysis Planning
Team for Extraterrestrial Materials (CAPTEM) addresses
these issues in some detail. CAPTEM’s recommendations,
like those of the NRC (2002), recognized a major technical
obstacle to designing the SRF: the problem of combining
high-level biological containment with clean-room condi-
tions. For example, when considering design of the con-
tainment facility for potentially hazardous samples, it is
expected that samples would be stored under negative air
pressure with respect to the outside laboratory to maximize
biocontainment. By contrast, non-hazardous samples that
must be kept pristine are typically stored under positive air
pressure to minimize contamination. This illustrates the un-
usual requirement for an SRF to maintain both sample con-
tainment and cleanliness.
A significant part of the scientific purpose of MSR would
be to evaluate returned martian samples for evidence of
martian prebiotic chemistry, martian life itself, or both. Since
Earth-sourced contaminants, particularly organic molecules,
can give a false-positive signal, contamination control would
be an essential aspect of the mission. It would be essential to
sterilize and clean all elements that the samples contact be-
tween their native state on Mars and their analysis in in-
struments on Earth. An implication for the SRF is that the
interior of the isolator cabinets, the trays, the sample con-
tainers, the sample-contact tools, and the sample chambers of
the organic detection instruments would need to be cleaned
to the same standards as for the sample-contact surfaces of
the flight system. The standards and protocols for achieving
this would have to be established, but this was not an as-
sumption or SRF requirement for the study teams.
2.D. US site selection issues
If it is decided to proceed with selection of a location for an
SRF, several issues would need to be addressed. First, one of
two general selection processes would have to be chosen:
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either an internal down-select process or an external nomina-
tion process. The former would entail that a national agency,
such as NASA, progressively narrowdown on a site thatmeets
its needs; the latter would involve a competition among can-
didate sites proposed by advocates. Although there are ad-
vantages and disadvantages to each approach, it is particularly
worth noting that the competitive process would take signifi-
cantlymore time, and this would need to be taken into account
in the planning and possibly costing. Second, any pass=fail
threshold site criteria would need to be established. These
might include perimeter security, government land ownership,
access to transportation and utilities, avoidance of legally
protected areas, and so on. Third, a set of evaluation criteria
would need to be established to determine relative prioritiza-
tion of candidate sites that pass the threshold criteria. In theUS,
it is required by theNational Environmental PolicyAct (NEPA)
that the potential environmental impacts be considered early in
the decision-making process, but other additional criteria
might include fewest land use conflicts, user accessibility and
convenience, risk due to natural hazards, and cost (including
the cost of mitigating natural hazards). Finally, partnering
options (of many different types) might play a significant role
in improving the cost, efficiency, or management of the SRF.
For example, placing the SRF adjacent to an existing BSL-4 lab
might result in certain efficiencies, and this would clearly have
site selection implications.
2.E. Costing guidelines
To prepare a cost estimate, the teams were given the fol-
lowing additional assumptions:
(a) The launch of the MSR mission was to occur in No-
vember 2013, and the assumed arrival of the sample
back on Earth was July 2016.
(b) Cost estimates for the analytical capabilities, both ac-
quisition and implementation, had to include multi-
spectral imaging, microscopy, mass comparison,
radiation counting, gas chromatography–mass spec-
trometry, Raman spectroscopy, X-ray diffraction, X-ray
tomography, X-ray fluorescence, atomic force micros-
copy, and scanning electron microscopy.
(c) No land-acquisition costs were included. The site for
the SRF is treated as a vacant lot in an urban area. That
is, roads, power, water and sewer are accessible.
(d) All tasks associated with NASA personnel were to be
budgeted separately.
(e) All costs related to the external science community
were to be budgeted separately.
3. Existing Facility Analogues for SRF Functionalities
As discussed above, there is no single facility in the world
that would meet all the assumed requirements of the SRF.
However, there are separate important facility engineering
analogues for most of the aspects of the SRF, and in many
respects the essence of the problem is in integrating these
different aspects in a way that has never been done before.
3.A. Astromaterials Curation Laboratories, Houston, TX
An important model for the facilities issues associated
with sample preservation is the Astromaterials Curation
Laboratories at NASA’s Johnson Space Center. This complex
is organized into a set of curation laboratories within two
interconnected buildings. Thus, they share certain facility
infrastructure (air, power, water), technical workforce,
management, and perimeter security. The different sample
collections (lunar rocks and soil, meteorites, cosmic dust,
comet dust, solar wind atoms) are curated under different
conditions, which are appropriate to the nature of the sam-
ples and the nature of the scientific questions these samples
are being used to address. These labs are equipped to pro-
cess, prepare, and distribute samples cleanly to science in-
vestigators across the globe.
The curation facility that is most relevant to returned
martian samples is the Lunar Sample Laboratory, where the
Apollo lunar samples are curated. These samples are stored
in positive pressure, high-purity nitrogen gloveboxes within
class 1,000 clean rooms. Concentrations of water vapor and
oxygen in the gloveboxes are maintained at or below 50ppm
and 20ppm, respectively. The only materials to come into
contact with the samples during processing are Teflon and
precision-cleaned stainless steel and aluminum. These mate-
rials and procedures were developed to minimize inorganic
and particulate contamination of the lunar rocks and soils.
3.B. Biosafety Level 4 laboratories
An alternative approach to evaluate requirements and key
parameters for SRF planning was to consider analogous as-
pects of the planning, construction, and certification histories
of BSL-4 laboratories (CDC=NIH, 2007; U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, 2007). As of 2004, there were six
such labs or lab complexes in North America (Canadian
Science Centre, Winnipeg, Canada; Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia; Georgia State
University, Atlanta, Georgia; Southwest Research Institute,
San Antonio, Texas; United States Army Medical Research
Institute for Infectious Diseases, Ft. Detrick, Frederick,
Maryland; and the University of Texas Medical Branch,
Galveston, Texas), several of which had either recently been
built or had recently added new buildings. Experience with
these six facilities showed that the time from planning to
certification in 2004 averaged about 8 years, though there
was significant dispersion about this mean. However, BSL-4
laboratories do not have a requirement to keep their samples
in pristine condition, so the relevance of the BSL-4 analogy
was open to questions (Race and Hammond, 2008).
3.C. Lunar Receiving Laboratory (LRL)
An important precedent for SRF planning was the devel-
opment of an analogous facility to support the return of lu-
nar samples by the Apollo Program beginning in 1969. While
in containment at the LRL, the samples were evaluated with
a test protocol that had been developed in meetings at the
Baylor College of Medicine in Houston; hence the name
‘‘Baylor Protocol’’ (Allton et al., 1998). The LRL and the
Baylor Protocol were used for the Apollo 11, 12, and 14
missions, after which testing for biological hazards in the
lunar samples was deemed unnecessary and was terminated.
There are several significant differences between the LRL
and a future SRF. First, the amount of material to be returned
by a MSR mission is assumed to be about 0.5 kg (iMARS,
2008; MEPAG ND-SAG, 2008), as compared to hundreds of
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kilograms returned by Apollo. Samples from six of the
Apollo missions passed through the LRL, but only those
from the first three missions did so under biological con-
tainment conditions. Second, the LRL was designed to
quarantine the astronauts, their capsule, and the lunar rock
and regolith samples, whereas the SRF would be designed
for sample containment and contamination control only.
(Sample containment refers to the protection of humans and
the environment from sample hazards, whereas contamina-
tion control refers to the protection of sample purity.) Third,
the process for securing approvals for construction of facili-
ties has changed significantly. The LRL was completed in
five years: initial planning for the LRL began in 1964, con-
struction took place from 1966–1967, operational tests began
in 1968, and certification was completed in early 1969
(Mangus and Larsen, 2004). A timeline this rapid is incon-
ceivable today, primarily due to the passage of NEPA, which
was signed into law on January 1, 1970. NEPA requires
federal agencies to evaluate their proposed projects for po-
tential environmental impacts, and the public must be
allowed to comment on the evaluation. Though federal
agency evaluations and subsequent public comment are
time-consuming endeavors, they are to be considered in as-
sessment of project alternatives prior to NASA taking steps
to commit to an irreversible path.
4. SRF Concept Results
The design concepts submitted by the industry teams
serve to highlight similarities and differences in how an SRF
design might be approached in the future as well as key
areas in which technology gaps would need to be filled.
4.A. Primary functional attributes of an SRF
There is a set of attributes that all three SRF concepts have
in common. Although the teams made different im-
plementation choices, each design includes the following:
(1) Receiving room to handle all Earth-return flight hardware.
The Earth entry flight element of MSR would deliver
the martian samples to Earth’s surface with the sample
canister intact. Regardless of what landing site is se-
lected, the SRF designs assume that terrestrial organ-
isms would contaminate the exterior of the return
spacecraft. The SRF would need to be able to receive all
the returned flight hardware and have a means by
which to extract the samples from within the space-
craft containment systems without incurring contami-
nation by abundant terrestrial life and without
alteration of the samples.
(2) Secondary containment barrier. The SRF concepts all
would provide a secondary containment barrier
equivalent to structures found in BSL-4 laboratory
complexes to back up the function of primary con-
tainment barriers. Space within this barrier is typically
separated from the outside environment by an airlock
and a sterilization system such as a chemical shower.
(3) Primary containment barrier. Within the containment
facility, there would be isolation cabinets, within
which a higher level of cleanliness could be main-
tained. In each design, these cabinets would provide
the primary barrier between the sample and the envi-
ronment, but the implementation details vary consid-
erably (e.g., number, connectivity, approach to sample
handling) as described below.
(4) Clean spaces for activities involving the pristine samples. All
SRF designs would provide spaces within the primary
containment barrier(s) where five different functions
could be performed. These spaces would have the
common attribute of being as close to pristine as possible
to preserve sample purity and assure integrity of sample
assessments. The necessary tools and instrumentation
would be accommodated, though the approaches do
vary. For example, instrumentation might be inside
cabinets or on laboratory benches, depending on the
specific approach to the containment barriers and sam-
ple manipulation. The five main functions would be:
(a) Initial sample characterization
(b) Pristine sample storage
(c) Space and tools for subdividing the samples
(d) Instruments and space needed for life detection
(e) Instruments and space needed for hazard assessment
(5) Means of moving samples and subsamples between func-
tional elements. All SRF designs address the need to
move samples and subsamples between pristine stor-
age and various test or processing stations while
maintaining containment and cleanliness standards.
The SRF must also provide systems for detailed record
keeping—essentially an early phase of sample curation.
(6) Air-handling system. One of the fundamental principles
of biosafety is to have a system of air pressure gradi-
ents, so that potentially hazardous samples would be
at a low air pressure relative to the human operators
and the external environment. If something should
leak, air flows toward, rather than away, from the
potential hazard. Therefore, a major facility subsystem
would be the air-handling capability.
(7) Waste sterilization system. It must be possible to sterilize
solid and liquid waste products from the containment
lab prior to release into the external environment.
(8) Capability to engage observers outside the containment lab
both locally and remotely. There would be intense sci-
entific and public interest in the returned martian
samples. Given that the SRF would be engineered for
minimal size and cost, only a limited number of people
would be able to work in the containment labs. All
teams concluded that it would be desirable to provide
for an expanded set of people outside the containment
barrier who have two-way communication in real time
with the scientific and technical staff who are physi-
cally carrying out the various tests and other actions
within the containment lab. There might be a need to
accommodate scientists outside the barrier who would
be both local (i.e., at the facility) and remote (i.e., at
their home institutions).
(9) Office space for permanent staff, including management, re-
search, and administrative. The SRF would need to pro-
vide for sufficient office space for the permanent staff.
(10) Office space for guest staff. Offices and conference rooms
would need to be provided for outside researchers.
This would be particularly important during the time
martian samples are under primary evaluation in the
facility.
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(11) Laboratory and engineering support facilities. Several
types of facility support functions would need to be
addressed, including cleaning and sterilization of
equipment, instrumentation support and calibration,
and provision of purified water and gases.
(12) Facility security system. When returned, the martian
samples would be entities of singularly high value.
Physical security to protect against theft, vandalism,
and terrorism would be required.
(13) Other. To ensure containment and contamination con-
trol, the SRF would require operator safety systems
such as fire protection, emergency oxygen supplies, an
uninterruptable power supply, and other backup sys-
tems. The SRF would need to be operated under con-
trolled conditions, including humidity, temperature,
and potentially inert gas. The facility would need the
capability to test and monitor all its essential safety
systems and their backups. The facility must be able to
maintain containment under a variety of off-nominal
conditions, including power failure.
4.B. FLAD team concept
The FLAD team developed a preliminary concept of con-
tainment and identified the aspects of the preliminary concept
that would require additional research before the concept
could be developed further. They proposed a design that
features three types of containment laboratories, each with
unique functions. These laboratories would be located above
utility and waste-treatment spaces and below air-handling
spaces with roof exhausts. This design is similar to most BSL-4
labs currently operating in the United States (Fig. 1).
Laboratory 1 would be a glovebox2 facility, designed for
manual initial processing of the spacecraft and samples.
Laboratory 2 would also be a glovebox facility that would
use robots to perform initial sampling, subdivision, and
sample testing. Gloves would be used only for maintenance
and initial placement of equipment. Gloves would be sealed
off during normal operations. Laboratory 3 would be a tra-
ditional BSL-4 suit facility, designed for biohazard and life
detection, including small animal studies. All laboratories
would be supplied with high efficiency particulate air
(HEPA) filtered air, and each would have a separate com-
bination of biological containment and air cleanliness ap-
propriate to its operation.
The ‘‘gloveboxes’’ would be linked double-walled Class III
Biological Safety Cabinets (BSCs), with reduced pressure
between the walls (Fig. 2). This technology is designed to
minimize contamination of both the laboratory and the
samples in the event of a leak. The double-walled version of
these cabinets and their associated gloves are not currently
available (they are concept only), and represent significant
design and operating challenges. While the single-walled
versions are an accepted alternative to suits for BSL-4 oper-
ations, the double-wall technology would require detailed
study to warrant such acceptance.
The FLAD SRF concept would include robots to perform
initial sampling, subdivision, and sample testing. The current
generation of industrial robots, particularly those used in mi-
croelectronics fabrication, has an impressive record of flexi-
bility, reliability, and cleanliness. However, the capabilities of
specific robots in the unique SRF environment must be the
subject of extensive development, testing, and verification.
4.C. LAS team concept
The LAS team concept is a fully robotic SRF, with the
exception of the in vivo biohazard testing. All sample han-
dling, testing, and storage would be carried out inside one
interconnected, multi-branching train of Class III BSCs
(Fig. 3). The various branches would lead to different clus-
ters. In the central node of each cluster, a robotic arm would
perform the operations on the samples with specially de-
signed end effectors, tools, instruments, and equipment.
These robotic arms might have 6 degrees of freedom if nee-
ded for complex motions, or be a simpler type for moving
samples from one station to another.
FIG. 1. Sample Receiving Facility cross section
(FLAD). Samples would be processed and tes-
ted in three separate laboratories. These labo-
ratories would be supported by extensive air
filtration and waste-handling equipment, lo-
cated above and below the laboratories,
respectively. Color images available online at
www.liebertonline.com=ast.
2Class III Biological Safety Cabinets are sometimes called ‘‘glo-
veboxes.’’ In this device, the interior of the cabinet is maintained
under negative pressure (relative to the room), with HEPA filters
attached to the supply and exhaust air systems. Class III BSCs can be
connected together so that different activities can be performed se-
quentially on samples in containment. Autoclaves, incubators, dunk
tanks, sample-transfer ports, and animal caging may be connected to
the glovebox line.
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A significant driver for the LAS team’s SRF concept is the
consideration that, based on past BSL-4 experience, most
breaches in containment are related to human error of one
type or another and, in particular, issues associated with the
gloves. In addition to susceptibility to needle punctures and
other kinds of material failure, there are risks to the samples
of imprecise manipulation of very small objects by double-
gloved human hands. LAS proposed a design by which ro-
botic manipulators would be employed, to the maximum
extent possible, for direct contact with samples. Since mul-
tiple activities would need to be performed on the samples,
this would require multiple isolator boxes and multiple ro-
botic manipulators. LAS made the case that this approach
would be the lowest-risk, both from the point of view of
sample contamination and containment assurance, though it
would clearly not be the lowest cost.
This concept would require a relatively small primary
containment area that would use robotics to minimize hu-
man exposure and contamination. Biohazard testing would
be carried out in a separate BSL-4 suit laboratory. These
laboratories would be located above utility and waste-
treatment spaces and below air-handling spaces.
The LAS team concept would use robots in most phases of
laboratory operations, including spacecraft dismantling, re-
moval of samples from their containers, initial sample char-
acterization and subdivision, subsample packaging and
transport, sample testing and analysis, and storage. Humans
would perform hands-on maintenance and repair via glo-
veports. The capabilities of robots to perform all these tasks
under stringent cleanliness and biosafety requirements
would require extensive development, testing, and verifica-
tion.
A unique feature of the LAS approach is the use of
‘‘common carriers’’ to transport and contain subsamples. The
use of such devices is standard in the electronics fabrication
industry, where conditions of extreme cleanliness are main-
tained in these ‘‘mini-environments’’ without requiring such
stringent cleanliness in the entire laboratory.
The LAS team report also devotes considerable attention
to the subjects of decontamination and sterilization. The SRF
must have the capability to decontaminate and sterilize the
entire laboratory, specific containment vessels, robots, and
individual components. Sterilization techniques are well
developed in industrial and research laboratories but would
FIG. 2. Double-walled BSC schematic (FLAD). Samples
would be stored and tested under nitrogen gas in the inner
chamber, which would be held at negative pressure with
respect to the surrounding room. Contamination from either
the sample or the room would be captured in the outer
chamber, which would be held at even lower pressure. Color
images available online at www.liebertonline.com=ast.
FIG. 3. Fully robotic SRF floor plan (LAS)
concept. Samples would be manipulated by
robotic arms in an interconnected series of
BSCs. Individual samples would be contained
and transported in extremely clean ‘‘common
carriers.’’ Color images available online at
www.liebertonline.com=ast.
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need to be adapted to the unique requirements of the SRF.
That is, decontamination techniques (i.e., complete removal
of organic and biological materials and contaminants) are not
well developed, since, ordinarily, sterilization is deemed
sufficient.
4.D. IDC team concept
The IDC team designed an SRF that would make minimal
use of robotics technology. Their design features separate
clean-room laboratories for physical and chemical testing,
life detection, and biohazard testing (Fig. 4). Sample han-
dling, physical and chemical testing, and storage would be
conducted in separate, controlled-atmosphere ‘‘isolator’’
gloveboxes.3 The isolators would be maintained at negative
pressure with respect to the laboratory, with HEPA filtered
interiors for a Class 10 clean environment to protect the
samples. The isolators would be located in BSL-3 level lab
rooms that would allow the staff to be dressed in lab gar-
ments, rather than positive-pressure personnel suits.
The isolators would not be interconnected, so each cabinet
must be self-sufficient (i.e., with its own airlock, gas supplies,
etc.). Samples would be moved between isolators by way of
‘‘rapid transfer ports.’’ These containers would feature a
double-door transfer system that would permit docking and
undocking from isolators while maintaining biocontainment.
Rapid transfer ports were originally developed for the nu-
clear industry but are now accepted for sample transport in
high-level biosafety laboratories.
4.E. Comparison of sample processing approaches
In our comparison of results of the studies, we focus on
the key characteristics associated with the sample processing
functions, with minor discussion of facility maintenance and
support staffing costs. The sample processing functions
could be grouped into five steps, as outlined in Table 1, along
with a summary of each team’s approach. Any credible ap-
proach to each processing step must address both cleanliness
and primary containment.
Containment approach. One method of containment
common to the three industry studies is the use of Class III
BSCs for primary containment in the initial sample proces-
sing steps. These cabinets would provide the highest level of
FIG. 4. Minimal robotic SRF floor plan (IDC). Samples would be stored and manipulated in individual glovebox isolators.
Materialwould bemovedbetween isolators via rapid-transfer ports.Color images available online atwww.liebertonline.com=ast.
3‘‘Isolators’’ are not necessarily ‘‘gloveboxes.’’ The term ‘‘isolator’’
is generally used to describe a bacteriology incubation device that
may have gloves attached.
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protection of the external environment from the internal
contents. They are used in many industrial and biological
research labs to provide the primary containment. They are
of gas-tight construction but ventilated to provide critical
environmental control, with both incoming and outgoing
HEPA filtration.
The three industry study concepts also use other critical
containment methods common in BSL-4 laboratories and
facilities. They include careful designs of the lab space sur-
rounding the BSCs, special waste treatment, air handling and
utility systems, as well as safety and security provisions.
Cleanliness. All study concepts make use of many im-
portant cleanliness methods. For example, all three concepts
propose the use of double-walled BSCs that, in addition to
containment, would provide some protection for the sam-
ples. Also, in the initial process of dismantling the Earth-
return vehicle, all three concepts would clean and sterilize
Table 1. SRF Sample Processing Function and Team Approaches
Step Function FLAD approach LAS approach IDC approach
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the outside of each spacecraft element and transfer the
cleaned element(s) into the next pristine BSC.
Disparate sample sizes. All three concepts share some
essential characteristics, such as their capability to deal with
all forms of material likely to be contained in the returned
sample. For example, all three SRF concepts plan to use ap-
propriate forms of containers and tools=end effectors for gas,
fines (<1mm), coarse material (>1mm), and ‘‘large rocks.’’
The designs presented in the three study concepts also share
the capability to capture the martian atmospheric gases,
separate dust from this sample, and package each for testing
and storage. They also have in common the notional capa-
bility to perform physical, chemical, life-detection, and bio-
hazard testing on a portion of each solid sample.
The differences in the designs originate primarily from
different ways to approach three issues:
(1) Approach to maintaining sample purity. The strategy of
MSR would include bringing samples that might
contain little or no evidence of life into an environment
(an Earth laboratory) where sources of life-related
contamination are essentially everywhere. Getting a
laboratory ‘‘blank’’ down to as low a level as possible
would likely take heroic efforts. Since human beings
are a major potential source of biological contamina-
tion, it is important to carefully consider the proximity
of humans to the martian samples.
(2) Approach to containment assurance. While the notion that
any returned martian samples must be kept isolated is
not unique, reduction of terrestrial contamination to an
acceptable risk threshold could be established in a
number of different ways.
(3) The relationship of instrumentation to the containment
system. Would all the instruments required to carry out
the purpose of the SRF need to be placed inside the
isolator cabinets (the primary containment system), or
could some of them be operated in an open laboratory?
Some of the instruments that would be required by the
test protocol might include relatively sophisticated
devices, such as scanning electron microscopes or mass
spectrometers.
4.F. Building size, cost, and schedule
At the heart of the motivation to conduct the SRF concept
studies was the need to gain a better understanding of pa-
rameters relevant to program planning—facility scope or
size, cost, and timing. The reports that were delivered,
combined with some interpretation to enable direct com-
parison, provided insights in each key area.
(1) Building size. A key objective of this study was to es-
timate the minimum building size that would be suf-
ficient to carry out the SRF function. The overall facility
size estimated by three independent groups ranged
from about 35,000 to 60,000 square feet. This floor
space could be broken down as follows:
(a) 25,000–40,000 square feet of space related to the
containment labs that constitute the facility core.
This would include not just the contained labora-
tory rooms (which are estimated to be about 5,000–
10,000 square feet, depending on the implementa-
tion concept) but also the gowning area(s), decon-
tamination showers, waste storage and treatment,
interstitial space, clean sample storage, airshafts,
and the perimeter corridor. The sample receiving
requirements imply a receiving dock connected to
a decontamination laboratory, which would need
to be part of the containment core of the laboratory
(one of its functions would be to test the spacecraft
seals)—its space needs are estimated to be about
1,000 square feet for the decontamination lab and
an additional 1–2 times that for the uncontained
receiving dock and an associated support lab.
(b) 10,000–15,000 square feet of office, administrative,
and logistical support space (including storage,
security).
(c) *5,000 square feet of high-containment lab-
support space (including testing shops).
(2) Cost. Each of the three design teams estimated the cost
and cost profile based on the SRF scenario that was
presented to them and their interpretation of how to
best implement it. At the end of the industry studies,
the Mars Program study lead normalized the three
different team estimates to place them on as compa-
rable a footing as possible, and a composite budget
profile was prepared (Table 2). The annual budgets in
the composite are expressed in units of dollars for each
respective fiscal year (so-called ‘‘real year’’ dollars),
with an overall total of $121 million. The permanent
staff necessary to operate the SRF is estimated to be
about 20–30 persons, for an annual operational cost of
$7 million. This estimate includes single-shift admin-
istrative, facility support and maintenance, and core
Table 2. Estimated Cost to Design, Build,
and Operate an SRF
Assume MSR launches in 2013, samples arrive on Earth in 2016
Annual budget
(millions,
real-year dollars) Life-cycle phase
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building operations staff. These figures do not include
the large number of personnel that would be required
to carry out the work of the Test Protocol, such as
guest scientists, planetary protection officials, and
planetary program managers during the years of ac-
tive sample handling and study within the SRF. Ad-
ditionally, we caution that this cost estimate also does
not include the research and technology development
efforts necessary to provide key functionality in the
SRF. Although this cost profile and total cost is specific
to the study scenario, it might be adjusted to alternate
future scenarios by applying the appropriate inflation
factors. To make such a cost adjustment to alternative
or future scenarios, it is crucial to refer to the key un-
derlying assumptions concerning schedule and cost
basis that were presented earlier in Section 3E.
(3) Schedule. The three teams each analyzed the schedule
that would be needed to acquire permits, conduct
design, construct the facility, and commission the SRF
they envisioned. The estimated total schedule duration
from the start of concept design and site selection ac-
tivities to readiness to receive samples is approxima-
tely 7 years. Note that this estimate does not include
the significant research and development effort re-
quired to reach the ready-to-build stage. Additionally,
this schedule is estimated to vary by 1 to 2 years,
primarily depending on whether NASA used an in-
ternal or external site selection process (an internal site
selection process would mean that only properties
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Government are
considered, whereas external site selection would
mean that private landowners, state governments, and
institutions could also propose facility locations). The
schedule would have to be lengthened by approxi-
mately 2 years should an external property purchase
be required. For comparison, Rummel et al. (2002) and
Atlas (2008) estimated that this amount of work would
take 9 years and 10 years, respectively. An obvious
difference is that these industry study teams were ac-
customed to designing and constructing buildings in
an environment where things move more quickly than
might be true of this unique SRF project.
4.G. Areas for further analysis
and technology development
Analysis of the SRF design trade space has identified
several major recognizable technology gaps [see also the
planning reported by Mattingly et al. (2005), which was
based on the same SRF studies reported in this paper] and
some areas requiring further analysis.
Decontamination techniques. Methods for removing organic,
inorganic, and particulate contamination from containers,
BSCs, robotic manipulators, and hand tools coming into
contact with the samples or their environment.
Double-walled glovebox containment. Design, fabrication,
testing, and certification of a biosafety cabinet with a double
wall enclosing a low-pressure space, designed to trap leak-
age from the samples as well as contaminants from the
outside laboratory.
Robotics. Demonstrate operations of dexterous ultra-clean
robots capable of sample transport and sample manipulation
(see also Mani et al., 2008). As pointed out by Bell and Allen
(2005), a key issue is whether the robotics can be made
compatible with the cleanliness requirements.
Pristine sample preservation. Methods of preserving martian
rock, soil, and atmosphere samples for long-term storage and
distribution to researchers in a wide variety of disciplines.
Scientific equipment required for proper sample analysis. Spe-
cific instruments to conduct the testing required for assess-
ment of possible life and biohazards in martian rock, soil,
and atmosphere samples.
5. Discussion and Future Planning
Three independent industry studies produced comple-
mentary high-level concepts for an SRF dedicated to an MSR
mission. These industry study concepts represent a ‘‘snap-
shot in time’’ relative to our understanding of the charac-
teristics of martian samples, the nature of a sample return
mission, the requirements of planetary protection, and the
role of international collaboration and regulations in the
mission. These detailed studies will need to be redone at
some point in the future in light of our updated knowledge
of Mars, an updated Test Protocol (note the emphasis on this
in Atlas, 2008), the possible internationalization of MSR (e.g.,
iMARS, 2008; Mani et al., 2008), and our evolving budgetary
and political realities.
5.A. Some considerations affecting SRF size and cost
The cost presented above is based on a specific scenario,
with a circumscribed set of assumptions and requirements.
However, the size and cost of the SRF is sensitive to the
several possible changes in the assumptions and require-
ments, some of which might have significant effect on its
cost.
Partnering options. The SRF scenario evaluated in this
study was assumed to be a single, new, stand-alone building.
Locating this building as part of a campus of other buildings
could enable the sharing or avoidance of certain costs, such
as perimeter security, access to transportation and utilities,
access to a trained technician pool, avoidance of legally
protected areas, and so forth. Although the general potential
for cost saving is obvious, this cannot be evaluated in detail
without specific designs.
Making use of existing construction. A single, new,
stand-alone building is the simplest (and perhaps the only)
way to meet the expected cleanliness requirements. How-
ever, it may be possible to configure the SRF as a newly
constructed wing of an existing building, or perhaps even as
a retrofit of an existing building.
Live animal testing. Because the present Draft Test Pro-
tocol (Rummel et al 2002) calls for conventional whole-
organism animal and plant in vivo testing, a significant part
of the floor space of the containment laboratory core in the
three scenarios relates to animal holding and evaluation
areas. Since the Draft Test Protocol was published in 2002
and used as a key element of the baseline requirements
for the 2004 industry study concepts, the fields of microbi-
ology and biohazard detection have advanced markedly.
The limits of detection and classification of microbial life in
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environmental samples have improved significantly, and the
use of animals in biohazard testing has been increasingly
replaced by cellular and molecular analyses. If a future ver-
sion of the test protocol eliminates this requirement in ac-
cordance with state-of-the-art practices and refinements at
the time the final protocol is implemented, the SRF design
would potentially be simpler.
More than one SRF. The study teams each analyzed the
design, construction, and operation of a single SRF. How-
ever, in the future it might be possible or required that there
are two or more SRFs in different locations, possibly in dif-
ferent countries. If there are multiple SRFs, they could con-
ceivably either be designed with identical capabilities or,
alternatively, with the capability to perform different, com-
plementary tests. The possibility of a two-SRF scenario has
been discussed both within the 2003–2005 MSR Project and
by iMARS (2008) as a potentially desirable, or perhaps even
politically necessary, attribute of an international MSR mis-
sion. A specific variation on the single-SRF approach (al-
luded to by Rummel et al 2002 in the Draft Test Protocol) is
the possibility that live animal testing could be done in a
secondary facility that meets the biocontainment require-
ments of the SRF, which would thus simplify the design and
cost of the primary facility. A prerequisite for any two-SRF
scenario would be a means by which to move unsterilized
samples between facilities and the approval to do so.
SRF expandability. This study evaluated the minimum
possible SRF that would be required to execute the test
protocol. If the samples are determined to be non-hazardous
(or are rendered non-hazardous by sterilization), they would
be made available for allocation to the world’s research
community. However, if signs of life are detected in one or
more samples, it might become necessary for future study of
the returned samples to take place in ongoing containment.
The samples would then need to be evaluated with addi-
tional methods beyond those used in the Draft Test Protocol.
The SRF may need to be designed so that it could be ex-
panded to accommodate additional laboratories; if this
functional requirement were accepted, it could have signifi-
cant cost implications.
6. Conclusions
Based on the analysis and interpretation of the 2004 in-
dustry study concepts, we suggest the following consider-
ations for planning an SRF to meet the needs of a future MSR
mission.
(1) Design. There is more than one possible design for a
stand-alone SRF that would meet the requirements of
MSR. Because the full set of requirements is not de-
fined at this time, it is not possible to optimize the
design. However, it is possible to understand the likely
possibilities enough to generate first-order budgeting=
planning parameters.
(2) Size. A minimal stand-alone SRF is estimated to have
an overall size of about 35,000–60,000 square feet, in-
cluding 25,000–40,000 square feet of containment-
related space that makes up the facility core (of which
5,000–10,000 square feet are the high-containment
laboratory rooms; the remainder would consist of
facility support systems including air handling, che-
mical showers, waste cookers, etc.), up to 5,000 square
feet of high-containment lab support space (test and
repair shops), and 10,000–15,000 square feet of office,
administrative, and logistical support space (including
storage and security).
(3) Schedule. The schedule needed to construct and com-
mission an SRF is estimated to be 7–9 years. Most of
this variance relates to whether NASA uses an internal
or an external site selection process. Because of the
schedule-constrained nature of an MSR (i.e., once the
samples have left Mars, spacecraft trajectories have a
defined schedule that cannot be easily slipped), it is
prudent to add additional schedule reserves, and a
good planning number is 10 years.
(4) Capital cost. The cost of an SRF would depend upon the
specific design approach, as well as on the final test
protocol executed in the facility. However, for future
planning a reasonable budget estimate is the escalated
equivalent of $120 million real-year dollars, using the
2013 MSR scenario described in Table 2.
(5) Operating cost. During the years the martian samples
would be evaluated in the facility, the annual building
operating budget would be estimated at $7 million,
which includes a building operations staff of 20–30
persons. This estimate does not include the large
number of personnel that would be required to carry
out the work of the Test Protocol.
(6) Advance technology development. Most of the technology
needed to design and construct an SRF already exists
in the biosafety, pharmaceutical, and sample curation
communities. However, along with decontamination
techniques, double-walled glovebox containment,
dexterous ultra-clean robotics, pristine sample preser-
vation, and scientific equipment required for proper
sample analysis, some aspects of the project will need
to be planned at two specific points in the building life
cycle: (a) those that affect the facility design and will
need to be known before facility construction, (b) those
that affect the instrumentation, the experiments, or
both, that will need to be known before the facility is
equipped.
(7) Partnering opportunities. Although not fully analyzed in
the industry study concepts, it is likely that partnering
opportunities might result in cost savings, operational
efficiency, or other benefits. Such opportunities could
be evaluated against the reference planning parame-
ters described above to determine whether this would
be a better way to meet the needs of an MSR than with
a stand-alone SRF.
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